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Testing for Factor Price Equality with Unobserved 
Differences in Factor Quality or Productivity†
By Andrew B. Bernard, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott*
We develop a method for identifying departures from relative factor 
price equality that is robust to unobserved variation in factor pro-
ductivity. We implement this method using data on the relative wage 
bills of nonproduction and production workers across 170 local 
labor markets comprising the continental United States for 1972, 
1992, and 2007. We find evidence of statistically significant differ-
ences in relative wages in all three years. These differences increase 
in magnitude over time and are related to industry structure in a 
manner that is consistent with neoclassical models of production. (JEL J31, J61, R23)
A central challenge for empirical studies of price variation is controlling for unobserved differences in quality. This challenge is particularly relevant for 
tests of factor price equality, where workers and other factors of production can 
vary substantially in terms of productivity across regions and industries. This paper 
develops a general test for relative factor price equality in the presence of such 
variation. Our test exploits cost minimization, which implies that the observed 
quantities chosen by firms facing observed prices contain information about fac-
tors’ unobserved attributes. We show that when these observables are multiplied, 
terms capturing unobserved factor productivity cancel. As a result, the equality 
of observed relative wage bills signifies the equality of unobserved, productivity-
adjusted relative factor prices.
Our approach possesses a number of important advantages over traditional meth-
ods. First, it allows for variation in factor productivity, quality, or composition across 
factors, regions, and industries.1 As such, it examines whether relative factor prices 
1 “Factor productivity” and “factor quality” both refer to the flow of factor services generated by an observed 
factor of production in the production technology. To simplify the exposition, we use the term “factor productivity” 
from now onwards, where it is understood that this also captures “factor quality.”
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are equal after controlling for the type of factor-augmenting productivity differences 
emphasized in Trefler (1993) and subsequent research. Second, the only data our 
approach requires are wage bills by type of worker, which are readily available in 
censuses of production and similar datasets. Alternate methods that rely on wage 
data, and control for variation in productivity using observed worker characteristics, 
are limited by the fact that the econometrician typically observes only a subset of the 
employee attributes visible to firms, giving rise to often substantial residual wage 
inequality as emphasized in recent empirical research. Our test, by contrast, controls 
for both observable and unobservable worker characteristics using factor productivi-
ties that vary by factor, region, and industry. Third, our approach is derived from 
cost minimization and hence is valid under a range of assumptions about factors, 
markets, and production, including imperfect competition and increasing returns 
to scale. This generality, and the parsimony of its data requirements, renders our 
method applicable in a wide variety of contexts, where unobserved variation in pro-
ductivity is a concern and only price and quantity data are available.
We implement our approach using data on nonproduction versus production 
workers across local labor markets comprising the continental United States in 
1972, 1992, and 2007. This setting is attractive for testing relative factor price 
equality for a number of reasons. Both labor mobility and goods market integra-
tion are plausibly greater across regions within countries than across countries, 
suggesting that factor price equality is more likely to be observed within countries 
than internationally. In addition, our data from the US Census of Manufactures 
record establishments’ activity within finely detailed regions and industries, allow-
ing us to focus on regional wage variation after controlling for industry-level 
determinants of wages via industry fixed effects. Furthermore, the boundaries of 
the 170 local labor markets used in our empirical analysis are defined by the US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis according to workers’ commuting patterns. As a 
result, they correspond to economically meaningful regions across which to test 
for relative factor price equality.
Surprisingly, despite the relatively high levels of goods and factor mobility within 
the United States, we strongly reject the hypothesis of relative factor price equality 
across US labor markets in all three years. We find that the relative wage of non-
production workers varies widely across labor markets, and that the magnitude of 
departures from the national average increases with time. In 1972, relative wage 
bills vary from 130 percent of the US average in Boston, Massachusetts to 73 per-
cent in Pueblo, Colorado. In 2007, the corresponding maximum and minimum are 
133 percent and 69 percent, for Boston, Massachusetts and Grand Forks, North 
Dakota, respectively. More broadly, we find that the distributions of relative wage 
bills for 1992 and 2007 exhibit fatter tails and wider supports than the distribution 
in 1972. Moreover, while these baseline results include four-digit SIC or six-digit 
NAICS industry fixed effects to estimate a common within-industry difference in 
relative wage bills for all industries, we find similar results when performing sepa-
rate tests for each two-digit SIC or three-digit NAICS sector.
Although our test for relative factor price equality holds under general assump-
tions about factors, markets, and production, we are able to decompose estimated 
variation in relative wage bills into estimates of productivity-adjusted relative wages 
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and relative factor employment under the special case of a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) production technology. Using an elasticity of substitution based 
on existing empirical estimates, the range of implied productivity-adjusted rela-
tive wages is 77 percent (Boston) and 137 percent (Pueblo) of the national average 
in 1972, and 75 percent (Boston) and 145 percent (Grand Forks) of the national 
average in 2007. Intuitively, regions with low productivity-adjusted relative wages 
exhibit high productivity-adjusted relative employment. In 1972, relative non-
production worker employment ranges from 220 percent (Boston) to 39 percent 
(Pueblo), while in 2007 it ranges 235 percent (Boston) to 33 percent (Grand Forks). 
Combining these estimates with observed relative wages allows us to back out the 
estimated relative productivity of nonproduction workers in each region and year. 
As with relative wage bills, we find that relative productivity becomes increasingly 
polarized over time.
As an additional check on the economic significance of our results, we examine 
the relationship between regions’ relative wage bills and their industry structure. In 
neoclassical models of production, only regions with the same productivity-adjusted 
factor prices are able to satisfy the zero-profit conditions for positive production for 
the same set of goods. Consistent with a departure from relative factor price equal-
ity, we find that the number of industries that region pairs produce in common in 
each year declines with the distance between their estimated relative wage bills. 
Furthermore, we find that regions whose relative wage bills pull further apart over 
time exhibit a decline in commonly produced industries.
Our method and empirical analysis relate to a number of existing literatures. Tests 
of relative factor price equality across countries are common due to the importance 
of this condition in neoclassical models of trade.2 In a standard version of these 
models, factor price equality implies price-wage arbitrage: countries with identical 
relative wages produce an identical mix of goods, so that price shocks affect relative 
wages in all countries.3 In the absence of factor price equality, however, countries 
can specialize in different mixes of goods, with the result that their factors can be 
insulated from shocks to the prices of goods they do not produce (Leamer 1987; 
Schott 2003, 2008). Tests for factor price equality within countries include Davis 
et al. (1997) and Debaere (2004), who study prefectures in Japan; Debaere (2004) 
who examines administrative regions in the United Kingdom; and Hanson and 
Slaughter (2002) who analyze US states. Our contributions to this literature include 
the development of a test that is robust to variation in factor-augmenting productiv-
ity differences across factors, regions, and industries, and the application of this 
test to relatively disaggregate geographic regions within a country. To the extent 
that US labor markets specialize in different sets of industries, they are likely to be 
2 Empirical tests of factor price equality focus both directly on relative wage variation and indirectly on impli-
cations of factor price inequality, such as production specialization. See, for example, Trefler (1993), Repetto and 
Ventura (1998), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Cuñat (2000), Debaere and Demiroglu (2003), and Schott (2003). 
Theoretical conditions necessary for factor price equality are explored by Samuelson (1949), McKenzie (1955), 
Dixit and Norman (1980), Wu (1987), Courant and Deardorff (1992), and Deardorff (1994).
3 Such Stolper-Samuelson effects also appear in newer, “heterogeneous-firm” models of trade, such as Bernard, 
Redding, and Schott (2007).
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asymmetrically affected by external shocks that have uneven effects across indus-
tries, such as China and India’s growing exports of labor-intensive goods.4
Our method and results also contribute to the large literature on US income 
inequality. A number of papers have demonstrated a rise in the wage of nonproduc-
tion workers relative to production workers or the relative wage of college graduates 
to high school graduates (see, for example, Katz and Murphy 1992 and Berman, 
Bound, and Griliches 1994). One issue in this literature is the extent to which 
changes in observed wage inequality reflect changes in the return to given worker 
characteristics versus unobserved changes in worker characteristics or composition 
(e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993 and Lemieux 2006). This issue is particularly 
salient because the occupation or education categories used to identify skilled and 
unskilled workers in this literature are typically broad. Our approach, by contrast, is 
robust to unobserved variation in factor quality, productivity, or composition across 
regions and industries within each worker category. Furthermore, much of the exist-
ing research on the US skill premium documents trends either for the United States 
as a whole, or for relatively aggregate Census Regions or states.5 Our analysis of 
170 local labor markets highlights the relevance of local variation in relative wages 
for understanding the evolution of overall US income inequality.
Finally, our findings relate to the macroeconomics literature on income conver-
gence. Research in this literature typically finds sluggish equilibration of relative per 
worker income levels across US regions over time, which suggests that either rela-
tive factor endowments or relative factor prices are at best converging slowly.6 Our 
results point to a role for relative factor prices, while our use of local labor market 
areas offers a much higher level of spatial resolution than is typical in this literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections I and II discuss 
the relevant propositions on relative factor price equality and develop their testable 
implications. In Section III, we outline our empirical methodology. Section IV dis-
cusses the data and reports the results of our tests for relative factor price equality 
across US regions in 1972, 1992, and 2007. Section V discusses the economic inter-
pretation of our results. Section VI concludes.
I. Relative Factor Price Equality
Factor price equality can be either absolute or relative. If absolute factor price 
equality holds (AFPE), regions have identical nominal factor rewards for identical 
productivity-adjusted factors. If relative factor price equality holds (RFPE), regions 
have identical relative factor rewards for identical productivity-adjusted factors, 
even though absolute factor prices can differ.
4 See, for example, the discussion in Friedman (2005). Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) demonstrate varia-
tion in manufacturing plants’ exposure and reaction to imports from low-wage countries. Bernard, Jensen, and 
Schott (2004) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (forthcoming) find that this exposure varies across regions within the 
United States.
5 Topel (1994), for example, documents a rise in US income inequality across nine US Census regions. An 
exception is Bound and Holzer (2000), which examines relative wage trends within US metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs).
6 See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Carlino and Mills (1993).
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We devote our theoretical and empirical attention in this paper to a test of rel-
ative factor price equality for two reasons. First, a test of relative factor price 
equality is more stringent in the sense that relative factor prices can be equal 
even if absolute factor price equality fails. Second, there is a natural and rich 
link between variation in regions’ relative factor prices and their industry struc-
ture, e.g., skill-intensive industries have an incentive to locate in skill-abundant 
regions. Nonetheless, in the Appendix, we provide a complementary test for abso-
lute factor price equality.
Our method for identifying departures from factor price equality controls for 
unobserved variation in region-industry-factor productivity that can bias traditional 
wage comparisons. We demonstrate how total payments to each factor, i.e., wage 
bills, can be used to control for this unobserved variation.
A. Production Structure
We assume a constant returns to scale production technology for output ( y rj ) 
industry j and region r:
(1)   y rj =  F j ( X rj ), 
where  X rj is a vector of productivity-adjusted factor inputs, which includes nonpro-
duction and production workers.
We model technology differences across regions and industries as factor aug-
menting following Trefler (1993). Therefore, while the function that aggregates fac-
tor services  F j (⋅) is the same across regions r within industry j, we allow factor 
productivity to vary freely across factors, regions, and industries. Specifically, the 
productivity-adjusted employment ( x rj ℓ ) and wage ( w rj ℓ ) for an individual factor ℓ 
equals the observed value adjusted for productivity:
(2)   x rj ℓ =   θ rj ℓ  ∼ xrj ℓ , 
   w r ℓ =   ∼ wrj ℓ / θ rj ℓ , 
where we use a tilde (˜) to signify observed values that have not been adjusted for 
productivity;  θ rj ℓ denotes productivity for factor ℓ in region r and industry j, where 
we choose units in which to measure the productivity of factors of production in 
each industry such that productivity in a base region (b) is equal to one ( θ bj ℓ = 1).
We begin by assuming perfectly competitive factor markets, in which no arbi-
trage implies that productivity-adjusted factor prices are equalized across industries 
( w rj ℓ =  w r ℓ for all j ). Nonetheless, observed factor prices can vary across industries 
because of differences in factor productivity ( ∼ wrj ℓ ≠  ∼ wrk ℓ and  θ rj ℓ ≠  θ rk ℓ for j ≠ k), and 
we consider imperfectly competitive factor markets in which productivity-adjusted 
factor prices differ across industries below. While our formulation of technology 
differences follows Trefler (1993), it is more general because we do not require that 
factor productivity is common across industries within each region, but rather allow 
the productivity of each factor in each region to differ across industries.
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Since technology differences are factor-augmenting in (1), our analysis explicitly 
allows for non-neutral technology differences that are uneven across factors, regions, 
and industries. For example, nonproduction workers in a particular region can have 
specialized knowledge relevant for a particular industry that generates higher produc-
tivity for that region and industry than in other regions and industries, whereas pro-
duction workers in the same industry and region have productivity levels comparable 
to those in other industries and regions. One special case of our framework is Hicks-
neutral technology differences, in which all factors in a region and industry are more 
productive than those in other regions and industries by the same proportion  A rj . In 
this special case, homogeneity of degree one of the production technology implies that 
(1) can be rewritten as  y rj =  A rj  F j ( ∼ Xrj ). More generally, our analysis also encom-
passes the case of Hicks-neutral and non-neutral components of technology differ-
ences, since we allow productivity to vary freely across factors, regions, and industries.
In our baseline formulation in (1) and (2), we assume that output depends solely on 
productivity-adjusted units of each factor of production ( x rj ℓ ) and not on their composi-
tion between physical units of the factor of production ( ∼ xrj ℓ ) and productivity ( θ rj ℓ ). As a 
result, units of a given factor of production are perfect substitutes up to a vertical adjust-
ment for differences in factor productivity. In a later section, we relax this assumption 
to allow each factor of production (e.g., nonproduction workers) to consist of many 
different types (e.g., managers and engineers), which are horizontally and vertically 
differentiated from one another. In that later extension, factor productivity corresponds 
to an index number that controls for differences in factor productivity and composition.
Firms in region r and industry j choose factor usage to minimize costs,
(3)  min ( W r )′   X rj , 
  subject to   F j ( X rj ) =  y rj ,
   X rj ≥ 0,
where  W r is the vector of productivity-adjusted factor prices with elements  w r ℓ. The 
solution to this problem defines the total cost function,
(4)   c rj =   Γ j ( W r )  y rj .
Since our approach is derived from cost minimization, firms can act either as 
price-takers in product markets (perfect competition; this section) or choose prices 
subject to a downward sloping demand curve (imperfect competition; next sec-
tion). While we begin by assuming constant returns to scale, later we extend the 
analysis to allow for internal and external increasing returns to scale. Similarly, 
our analysis is compatible with imperfectly competitive factor markets in which 
productivity-adjusted factor prices differ across industries ( w rj ℓ ≠  w rk ℓ for j ≠ k), as 
long as employment is chosen to minimize costs given factor prices.7 From the total 
7 Our analysis is therefore consistent with “right to manage” models of union behavior, where firms and unions 
bargain over wages within an industry but firms choose employment (see, for example, Farber 1986 and Layard, 
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cost function, the demand for productivity-adjusted factor ℓ can be obtained using 
Shephard’s lemma:
(5)   x rj ℓ =  y rj  ∂  Γ j (⋅) _∂  w r ℓ .
Taking the ratio of these demands for any two factors provides an expression 
for the relative demand for productivity-adjusted factors of production. Thus the 
demand for nonproduction workers (n ) relative to production (P) workers is
(6)    n rj  _ P rj =  
∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n 
 _ ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r P .
Using the relationship between productivity-adjusted and observed values in (2), 
this implies the following relative demand for observed factors of production,
(7)    
∼ nrj 
 _ ∼ Prj 
=   θ rj 
P
 _ θ rj n   
∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n 
  ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r P .
B. null Hypothesis of relative Factor Price Equality (rFPE )
Under the null hypothesis that all relative factor prices are equalized (RFPE), 
 productivity-adjusted relative wages and factor usage across regions r and b must 
be equal,
(8)    w r 
n 
 _ w r P =  
 w b n  _ w b P , 
   
 n rj 
 _ P rj =  
 n bj 
 _ P bj , 
where the second equation follows directly from equation (6).8 Under this null 
hypothesis of RFPE, observed relative wages and factor usage across regions are 
given by
(9)    
∼ wrj n
 _ ∼ wrj P =  
 θ rj n
 _ θ rj P   
 ∼ wbj n
 _ ∼ wbj P , 
   
 
∼ nrj 
 _ ∼ Prj 
=   θ rj 
P
 _ θ rj n   
 
∼ nbj 
 _ ∼ Pbj 
.
Nickell, and Jackman 1991). With industry-specific bargaining, wages will generally vary across industries. As 
discussed further below, our empirical specification allows for inter-industry wage differentials through the inclu-
sion of industry fixed effects.
8 Homogeneity of degree one of the cost function implies that the derivatives ∂  Γ j /∂  w r ℓ are homogenous of 
degree zero in factor prices. It follows immediately from equation (6) that, with identical productivity-adjusted 
relative factor prices, regions will employ productivity-adjusted factors of production in the same proportions.
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These relationships demonstrate the difficulty of using either observed rela-
tive wages, or observed factor usages, to test for factor price equality. Even under 
the null hypothesis of RFPE, observed relative wages and usages can vary across 
regions within industries because of unobserved differences in factor productivity 
(i.e.,  θ rj n ≠ 1 or  θ rj P ≠ 1).9
We solve this problem by combining observed wages and employment into wage 
bills, where the wage bill for factor ℓ is equal to  ∼ wrj ℓ  ∼ xrj ℓ =  w rj ℓ  x rj ℓ . As is evident from 
equation (9), when observed wages and employment are multiplied, the terms in 
region-industry-factor productivity cancel. As a result, observed relative wage bills, 
which are generally available to empirical researchers, are equal under the null 
hypothesis of RFPE,
(10)  ( H 0 : rFPE)   
∼ wagebill rj n
 _ ∼ wagebill rj P
=   
∼ wagebill bj n
 _ ∼ wagebill bj P 
.
C. Alternative Hypothesis of non-relative Factor Price Equality  
(non-rFPE )
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE, the productivity-adjusted relative 
w r n / w r P wage differs across regions r and b by a multiplicative factor,  γ rb nP ,
(11)    w r 
n 
 _ w r P =  γ rb 
nP   
 w b n  _ w b P ,
where again we let region b be the benchmark region:  γ rb nP =  γ r nP / γ b nP and  γ b nP = 1. 
Across regions, observed relative wages now vary because of both differences in 
factor productivity and differences in productivity-adjusted factor prices:
(12)    
∼ wrj n
 _ ∼ wrj P =  γ rb 
nP   
 θ rj n
 _ θ rj P   
 ∼ wbj n
 _ ∼ wbj P .
Additionally, observed factor usage varies across regions because of both differ-
ences in factor productivity and differences in factor demand driven by the variation 
in productivity-adjusted relative factor prices:
(13)    
∼ nrj 
 _ ∼ Prj 
=   θ rj 
P
 _ θ rj n   [  ( ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n  _ ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r P ) / ( ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w b n  _ ∂ Γ j (⋅)/∂  w b P) ]    ∼ nbj  _ ∼ Pbj .
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative 
employments, equations (12) and (13), the terms in unobserved factor productiv-
ity again cancel. However, relative wage bills now generally vary across regions 
9 As the factor productivity of the base region has been normalized to equal one,  θ bj n = 1,  θ rj n ≠ 1 indicates that 
factor productivity differs in industry j between the base region and region r.
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because of differences in productivity-adjusted factor prices and variation in pro-
ductivity-adjusted factor usage,
(14)  ( H 1 : non − rFPE )    
∼ wagebill rj n
 _ ∼ wagebill rj u 
= η rbj nP    
∼ wagebill bj n
 _ ∼ wagebill bj u 
, 
where
(15)  η rbj nP =  γ rb nP  [  ( ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n  _ ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r P ) / ( ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w b n  _ ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w b P) ] .
D. Testing for rFPE
Together equations (10) and (14) provide the basis for a test of the null hypoth-
esis of RFPE that is robust to unobserved variation in factor productivity across fac-
tors, regions, and industries. The intuition for this method is as follows. When firms 
minimize costs, the observed quantities chosen given observed factor prices contain 
information about the unobserved productivity of the factors. As a result, multiply-
ing observed factor prices by observed factor quantities enables us to control for 
unobserved variation in factor productivity.
Our test for RFPE is derived under a number of assumptions of cost minimiza-
tion, constant returns to scale, and vertical differentiation of factors of production. In 
addition, we test the null hypothesis that all relative factor prices are equalized.10 To 
the extent that other factors of production have differing degrees of complementar-
ity with nonproduction and production workers, and to the extent that the prices of 
these other factors vary across regions, this provides one potential explanation for 
regional differences in relative wage bills and productivity-adjusted relative wages. 
However, while our test is a joint test of our assumptions and the null hypothesis that 
all productivity-adjusted relative factor prices are equalized, its ability to allow for 
factor-augmenting productivity differences across factors, regions, and industries 
is an important advantage relative to other possible approaches. Furthermore, in 
subsequent sections below, we show how our assumptions can be relaxed to allow 
for example for increasing returns to scale and for both horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiation of factors of production.
A failure of RFPE has two effects on the relative wage bill for an industry across 
regions. The first direct effect is given in equation (15) by the difference in relative 
productivity-adjusted wages,  γ rb nP . The second indirect effect is given by the term 
inside the square brackets in equation (15), which captures the changes in rela-
tive factor usage induced by the differences in relative productivity-adjusted fac-
tor prices, and is also a function of  γ rb nP . Further intuition for these two sources of 
variation in relative wage bills can be garnered by considering the special case in 
10 With perfect capital mobility, the rate of return to capital will be equalized across regions. However, as long 
as there is imperfect mobility of at least one other factor of production, productivity-adjusted relative factor prices 
will in general vary.
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which the production technology for a given industry exhibits a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) across all factors of production ( σ j = 1/(1 − ρ j ), where ρ j 
is the CES parameter for industry j ). In this special case, the differences in relative 
wage bills in (10) become
(16)  η rbj nP =  γ rb nP  [ ( γ rb nP ) 1/(ρ j −1) ] = ( γ rb nP ) ρ j /(ρ j −1) , 
where  γ rb nP captures the direct effect of the difference in relative wages, while ( γ rb nP  ) 1/(ρ j −1) inside the square brackets in the middle equation captures the indirect 
effect of the induced difference in relative factor usage.
One insight that emerges from considering the special case of a CES production 
technology is that a finding of η rbj nP ≠ 1 in our relative wage bill test is sufficient but 
not necessary to reject RFPE. When the production technology is Cobb-Douglas 
(ρ j = 0 in equation 16), relative wage bills are equalized (η rbj nP = 1) even if 
 productivity-adjusted factor prices differ across regions ( γ rb nP ≠ 1). However, if 
relative wage bills are not equalized (η rbj nP ≠ 1), productivity-adjusted relative factor 
prices must differ across regions ( γ rb nP ≠ 1).11 Therefore a finding that relative wage 
bills differ is sufficient to reject RFPE. As we show below, relative wage bills in 
fact vary substantially across US local labor markets, and hence the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption does not appear to provide a close approximation to the data.
II. Generalizations
In this section we show that our method for testing for relative factor price equal-
ity is robust to a number of generalizations, including imperfect competition, exter-
nal and internal economies of scale, and variation in factor composition.
A. imperfect competition
The robustness of our method to imperfect competition derives from its use of 
cost minimization. Suppose that firms maximize profits subject to a downward 
sloping inverse demand curve, p rj ( y rj ), under conditions of imperfect competition, 
which implies the following first-order condition for profit-maximization,
(17)   d p rj ( y rj ) _
d y rj   y rj + p rj ( y rj ) −  Γ j (⋅) = 0,
where we continue to assume that  c rj =  Γ j (⋅) y rj is constant returns to scale. Defining 
the elasticity of demand as  ε rj ( y rj ) ≡ −(d y rj /d p rj )p rj / y rj , where p rj denotes price, 
we obtain the standard result that equilibrium price is a mark-up over marginal cost,
(18)  p rj ( y rj ) =  (  ε rj ( y rj ) _   ε rj ( y rj ) − 1)  Γ j (⋅).
11 Indeed, the fact that ( γ rb nP ) ρ j /(ρ j −1) is close to 1 for ρ j close to 0 actually makes it harder to reject the null 
hypothesis of RFPE and strengthens any finding of a rejection.
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Applying Shephard’s lemma, equilibrium demand for each productivity-adjusted 
factor of production continues to be given by the derivative of the total cost function 
with respect to the productivity-adjusted factor price, as specified in equation (5). 
Therefore, the introduction of imperfect competition leaves the derivation of our test 
for relative factor price equality unchanged.
B. External Economies of Scale
Our framework can also be extended to incorporate external economies of scale 
under either perfectly or imperfectly competitive market structures. Under external 
economies of scale, each firm’s production technology remains a constant returns 
to scale function of its own factor inputs and each firm takes factor productivity as 
given when minimizing costs. But factor productivity depends on overall production 
scale for the region and industry because of the external economies of scale. In the 
most general case, we have,
(19)   θ rj x =  θ rj x ( y rj ,  y r, −j ,  y −r, j ,  y −r, −j ), 
where  y r, −j is the vector of outputs in all other industries in a region,  y −r, j is the vec-
tor of all other regions’ outputs in the industry, and  y −r, −j is the vector of all other 
regions’ outputs in all other industries. Since our method allows factor productivity 
to vary freely across factors, regions, and industries, and does not make assumptions 
about its determinants, and since the cost-minimization behavior of the firm remains 
the same (see equation 3), the derivation of our test for relative factor price equality 
again remains unchanged.
C. internal Economies of Scale
Our analysis can also incorporate internal economies of scale, which must be 
combined with imperfect competition. We assume that the cost function (4) remains 
homothetic, but is no longer homogenous of degree one in the firm’s own factor 
inputs. Under imperfect competition, equilibrium price continues to be a mark-up 
over marginal cost,
(20)   p rj ( y rj ) =   ε rj ( y rj ) _   ε rj ( y rj ) − 1   
∂  c rj ( W r  ,  y rj )  _∂ y rj  .
where marginal cost, ∂  c rj ( ⋅ ) /∂ y rj , now depends on output. Equilibrium demand for 
quality-adjusted factors of production can be obtained from Shephard’s lemma, and 
the relative demand for observed skilled and unskilled workers is given by
(21)    
∼ nrj 
 _ ∼ Prj 
=   θ rj 
P
 _ θ rj n    
∂ c rj ( W r ,  y rj )/∂  w r n 
  __∂  c rj ( W r ,  y rj )/∂  w r P .
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Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative 
employments, the terms in unobserved factor productivity again cancel. The expres-
sion for relative wage bills becomes
(22)    
∼ wagebillrj n
 _ ∼ wagebillrj P =  γ rb 
nP  [  ( ∂  c rj (⋅)/∂  w r n   _∂ c rj (⋅)/∂  w r P ) / ( ∂  c rj (⋅)/∂  w b n   _∂  c rj (⋅)/∂  w b P) ]    ∼ wagebillbj n _ ∼ wagebillbj P , 
where the terms in brackets that capture relative unit factor input requirements are 
now a function of output, y.
In the standard case of trade under internal economies of scale in the theoretical 
literature (Helpman and Krugman 1985), firms within an industry face the same 
constant elasticity of substitution  ε j , cost functions are homothetic and identi-
cal within industries, and there is free entry so that price equals average cost. 
Combining free entry with the pricing relationship in (20), the equilibrium ratio 
of average to marginal cost is equal to a constant  ε j /( ε j − 1), which with a homo-
thetic cost function defines a unique equilibrium value of output for each firm 
in the industry. Under the null hypothesis of RFPE,  γ rb nP = 1, and with all firms 
in the industry facing the same factor prices and producing the same output, the 
terms in parentheses in (22) cancel. Therefore we again obtain the prediction that 
relative wage bills are equalized under the null hypothesis of RFPE.12 More gen-
erally, in the presence of internal economies of scale, variation in firm size across 
regions and industries can influence relative factor demands and provides a poten-
tial explanation for rejections of RFPE.
D. Factor Productivity and composition
While our analysis has so far assumed vertical differentiation of factors of pro-
duction, in this section we show that the analysis can be extended to allow each fac-
tor of production (e.g., nonproduction workers) to consist of many different types 
(e.g., managers and engineers), which are horizontally and vertically differentiated 
from one another. We assume a constant returns to scale production technology 
that is weakly separable in nonproduction and production workers, so that firms 
first choose optimal quantities of nonproduction and production workers as a whole 
before choosing optimal amounts of each worker type within these two categories. 
We demonstrate the point formally for nonproduction workers, but, without loss of 
generality, the argument applies for any factor of production. Though, for simplic-
ity, we consider two types of nonproduction workers, the analysis goes through for 
any number of types. To avoid notational clutter, we suppress region and industry 
subscripts throughout this section.
12 See Helpman and Krugman (1985) for further analysis of theoretical models of monopolistic competition and 
increasing returns to scale with factor price equalization.
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We assume that the productivity-adjusted flow of nonproduction worker services 
is a constant returns to scale function of the productivity-adjusted flow of manage-
rial and engineering services:
(23)  n = ϕ  ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) , 
 = ϕ  (  n 1  _  ∼ n 1 +  ∼ n 2 ,   n 2  _  ∼ n 1 +  ∼ n 2)  ( ∼ n 1 +  ∼ n 2) , 
 = ϕ  ( θ  n 1   ∼ n1 ,  θ  n 2   ∼ n2 )  ∼ n, 
where n is productivity-adjusted nonproduction worker services,  n 1 is productivity-
adjusted managerial services,  n 2 is productivity-adjusted engineering services, ϕ (⋅) 
is linearly homogenous of degree one,  
∼ n =  ∼ n 1 +  ∼ n 2 is the observed number of 
nonproduction workers,  θ  n 1  =  n 1 / ∼ n1 is the productivity of managers,  θ  n 2  =  n 2 / ∼ n2 
is the productivity of engineers, and  ∼ n 1 =  ∼ n1 / ( ∼ n1 +  ∼ n2 ) and  ∼ n 2 =  ∼ n2 / ( ∼ n1 +  ∼ n2 ) 
are the observed shares of engineers and managers in nonproduction employment. 
Equation (23) may be rewritten more compactly as
(24)  n =  θ n  ∼ n,   θ n ≡ ϕ  ( θ  n 1   ∼ n1 ,  θ  n 2   ∼ n2 ) , 
where the productivity of nonproduction workers is now an index number, 
 θ n = ϕ ( θ  n 1   ∼ n1 ,  θ  n 2   ∼ n2 ) , which captures the productivity of managers, the produc-
tivity of engineers, and the composition of nonproduction workers between these 
two categories.
The productivity-adjusted wage of nonproduction workers is now a price index, 
defined as the dual to equation (23):
(25)   w n = ψ  ( ω 1 ,  ω 2 ) , 
where  ω 1 is the productivity-adjusted wage of managers and  ω 2 is the productivity-
adjusted wage of engineers. Expenditure on productivity-adjusted nonproduction 
worker services is equal to observed expenditure on nonproduction workers,
(26)   w n n =  ∼ wn  ∼ n, 
where  w n is the price index defined above and  ∼ wn is the observed wage per non-
production worker. It follows that the productivity-adjusted nonproduction worker 
price index and the observed nonproduction worker wage are related according to
(27)   w n =  ∼ wn / θ n .
It is evident from equations (24) and (27) that the derivation of the test for relative 
factor price equality remains exactly the same as above and is unchanged by this 
extension.
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III. Econometric Specification
In Section I, we showed that under the null hypothesis of RFPE, the relative wage 
bills of nonproduction and production workers (10) are equalized across regions 
within industries. To test this prediction empirically, we estimate the following OLS 
regression using region-industry data on the relative wage bill of nonproduction and 
production workers:
(28)  ln  (  ∼ wagebill rj n _ ∼ wagebill rj P ) =  α r +  μ j +  u rj , 
where  α r is a region fixed effect;  μ j is an industry fixed effect; and  u rj is a stochastic 
error. We report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
region, which allows the error term to be correlated across industries within regions 
without imposing prior structure on the pattern of this correlation.
The industry fixed effects control for differences in the relative wage bills of 
nonproduction and production workers across industries that are common to all 
regions. For example, some industries may use nonproduction workers more inten-
sively than others, and hence have higher values for the relative wage bill for non-
production workers. More generally, other industry characteristics controlled for by 
the industry fixed effects include inter-industry wage differentials, or differences 
across industries in the classification of nonproduction and production  workers. 
Additionally, since the left-hand side of the regression is the log relative wage bill, 
any region-industry characteristic that has the same proportionate effect on the 
wages or employment of nonproduction and production workers cancels from the 
numerator and denominator of the relative wage bill.
The region fixed effects capture average within-industry differences in relative 
wage bills across regions. We normalize the region and industry fixed effects so that 
they each sum to zero, which implies that we can estimate a separate fixed effect 
for each region and industry as well as the regression constant (see, for exam-
ple, Greene 2002). Under this normalization, the regression constant captures the 
mean relative wage bill across regions and industries, and the region and industry 
fixed effects are estimated as deviations from this overall mean, which provides an 
implicit base region. Since relative wage bills are equalized under the null hypoth-
esis of RFPE, a test for the joint statistical significance of the region fixed effects 
corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis of RFPE. In our baseline specification, 
the region fixed effects capture average within-industry differences in relative wage 
bills between regions that are assumed to be same for all industries. As a robustness 
test, we also consider an augmented specification in which we estimate (28) sepa-
rately across four-digit SIC or six-digit NAICS industries within each two-digit 
SIC or three-digit NAICS sector. These estimations allow the size of the average 
difference in relative wage bills within more disaggregate industries to vary across 
more aggregate sectors.
Our empirical specification (28) is estimated using region-industry observations 
with positive relative wage bills for nonproduction and production workers. Since 
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each industry is not necessarily active in each region in the data, these data form 
an unbalanced panel of industries across regions. Under the null hypothesis that 
productivity-adjusted relative factor prices are equalized, the zero-profit conditions 
for positive production are satisfied for each sector in each region. As a result, posi-
tive production is feasible for each industry in each region and there is no reason for 
a systematic selection of industries across regions. It follows that the region fixed 
effects are statistically insignificant under RFPE, both because relative wage bills 
are equalized within industries across regions and because there is no systematic 
industry selection.
In contrast, under the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE, the zero-profit con-
ditions for positive production are not satisfied for each industry in each region, 
and industries that use a factor intensively should systematically select into regions 
where that factor has a low productivity-adjusted relative price. It follows that the 
region fixed effects are in general statistically significantly different from zero under 
non-RFPE, both because relative wage bills differ across regions within industries 
and because industry selection is nonrandom. Whatever the respective contributions 
of the two sources of the statistical significance of the region fixed effects under 
the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE, their statistical significance is sufficient to 
reject relative factor price equality. As a check on our empirical estimates of relative 
wage bill differences, we provide direct evidence below on the extent to which they 
are correlated with differences in industry structure, as expected from the zero-profit 
conditions for production in a neoclassical economy.
IV. Empirical Implementation
In this section, we use our method to test for relative factor price equality across 
local US labor markets in 1972, 1992, and 2007.
A. Data
We implement our method using data from the US Census of Manufactures 
(CM). These data have a number of advantages with respect to testing for relative 
factor price equality. First, the CM records the employment and wages of all US 
manufacturing establishments every five years, and hence can be used to construct 
representative data on aggregate wages and employment for each region-industry 
over a long time period, even when using finely-detailed definitions of regions and 
industries.13 Second, establishments can be linked to one of the 170 Economic Areas 
(EAs) that make up the continental United States. These regions are defined by the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis based on commuting patterns and other mea-
sures of local economic activity, and therefore correspond closely to the concept 
of regional labor markets where wages are determined.14 EAs also provide greater 
13 As is usual in empirical work using the CM, we exclude very small establishments, known as “administrative 
records,” which are not required to report information on their inputs.
14 See http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/econlist.cfm and http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/rea/rea1104.
htm for more detail. As noted in the latter, these Economic Areas “define the relevant regional markets  surrounding 
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resolution of relative factor price variation than more aggregate geographic units 
that have been studied in much of the literature on US wage inequality, such as 
Census Regions or states.15
Third, the CM records the major industry of each establishment according to 
detailed industry categories. For the 1972 and 1992 CMs, each establishment is 
linked to one of 455 four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories. 
For the 2007 CM, there are 473 six-digit North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) categories.16 We compare relative wage bills across regions within 
these detailed industry categories to control for any industry-level determinants of 
relative wages. To further ensure that the economic activities undertaken by regions 
within industries are as comparable as possible, we drop industries that explicitly 
include miscellaneous products, i.e., four-digit SIC or six-digit NAICS codes end-
ing in “9.”17 While non-manufacturing industries are not included in our analysis, 
the null hypothesis of relative factor price equality implies that relative wage bills 
are equalized within each industry, and hence can be tested using industries within 
manufacturing.
Fourth, the CM reports wage and employment data by two worker categories—
nonproduction and production—that have been used widely in the literature con-
cerned with US wage inequality.18 While the productivity, quality, and composition 
of nonproduction and production workers (or any other worker category) can vary 
across regions and industries, a key advantage of our test for relative factor price 
equality is that it is designed explicitly to control for such variation. Finally, the 
combination of wage and employment data for different categories of workers and 
detailed region and industry disaggregation enables us to examine the relationship 
between relative factor prices and industry structure.
Though we implement our test using the US Census of Manufactures, it can in 
principle be applied to any dataset containing information on wages and employ-
ment by region and industry for different categories of workers, such as the US 
Current Population Survey (CPS). An important consideration in the use of such 
datasets, however, is their representativeness. While use of the CPS may be appro-
priate for large regions (e.g., Topel 1994 uses the CPS to examine wages across the 
nine US Census Regions that comprise the United States), it provides a less attrac-
tive setting for analysis of relative wages across more disaggregate labor markets: 
when one simultaneously conditions on worker type, detailed industry, and detailed 
region, as required by our analysis, the number of observations for many cells is 
too small to be statistically representative. Furthermore, although the CPS data 
do have the advantage of containing more information on worker characteristics, 
metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas” and are used throughout the federal government and the private sector 
to describe local economic activity.
15 A number of studies (e.g., Topel 1986, Lee 1999, Bound and Holzer 2000, Hanson and Slaughter 2002, and 
Bernard and Jensen 2000) document variation in income inequality or wages across either the nine US Census 
regions or across US states. Related work using wage regressions by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996) finds 
that worker characteristics are priced differently across US Census regions.
16 For results comparing 1972 and 2007, we map SIC industries to NAICS industries using a concordance 
developed by Pierce and Schott (forthcoming).
17 This pruning leaves us with 396 SIC industries and 433 NAICS industries.
18 See, for example, Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993).
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a growing empirical literature using employee data emphasizes the importance of 
residual wage inequality that is unexplained by worker characteristics observable to 
the econometrician.19 Our method can be employed in settings in which information 
on worker characteristics is incomplete or missing because the factor productivity 
terms (e.g.,  θ rj n ) account for variation in factor productivity, quality, and composition 
across factors, regions, and industries.
B. Testing rFPE
Using our baseline specification (28), we find strong evidence of a rejection of 
relative factor price equality. The null hypothesis that the region fixed effects are 
jointly equal to zero is rejected at the one percent level in all three years.20 Table 1 
reports the region fixed effects ( α r ) for 1972 and 2007. The region fixed effects for 
1992, as well as the standard errors clustered by region for all estimates, are reported 
in the online Appendix. Since the region fixed effects are normalized to sum to 
zero, they capture average proportional differences in relative wage bills within 
industries. As indicated in the tables, relative wage bills in 1972 vary from a low 
of 73 percent ( e −0.31 ) of the US average in Pueblo, Colorado to 130 percent ( e 0.26 ) 
in Boston, Massachusetts. In 2007, the maximum and minimum estimates are 69 per-
cent and 133 percent for Grand Forks, North Dakota and Boston, Massachusetts, 
respectively.
Overall, we find that the number of EAs with statistically significant differences 
in relative wage bills at the 5 percent level are 151, 156, and 157 in 1972, 1992, 
and 2007, respectively.21 Further confirmation of a rejection of relative factor price 
equality is manifest in tests of the null hypothesis that unique region-pairs’ relative 
wage bills are equal, i.e.,   αr =   αs for all regions s > r. We find that the average 
region rejects relative factor price equality with more than 90 percent of the remain-
ing regions in all three years, and that every region rejects relative factor price equal-
ity with at least 77 percent of the remaining regions in all three years.
Examination of the distributions of estimated relative wage bills reveals an 
increase in the magnitude of departures from relative factor price equality over time. 
This trend is illustrated in Figure 1, which displays kernel density estimates of the 
region fixed effects by year, where these region fixed effects sum to zero in each 
year. The densities for both 1992 and 2007 exhibit fatter tails and wider support 
than the density for 1972, indicating a polarization of relative wage bills over time. 
As reported in Figure 1, the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 1992 and 2007 distri-
butions are both further from the implicit national average of 0. Across all bilateral 
pairs in each year, we find the median absolute difference in unique region-pairs’ 
relative wage bills,  |   αr −   αs | , rises from 0.108 in 1972 to 0.117 and 0.116 in 1992 
and 2007, respectively.
19 See, for example, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993); Lemieux (2006); and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).
20 The F-statistics for this test are: 103,538.95 (1972); 10,407,973.00 (1992); and 38,402.69 (2007).
21 In principle, these tests for the number of EAs in each year with statistically significant differences in relative 
wage bills could be affected by changes in the overall precision of the estimates over time. In practice, we find that 
the overall precision of the estimates, as reflected in the regression standard error, does not change substantially 
over time.
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Polarization of relative wage bills is also evident geographically. Figure 2 sorts 
regions’ relative wage bills into quartiles, by year. To render these quartiles com-
parable over time, they are defined using the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the 
1972 distribution, which are −0.079, 0.013, and 0.070, respectively. As indicated 
Table 1—Estimated 1972 and 2007 Relative Wage Bill Coefficients
Name 1972 2007   Name 1972 2007   Name 1972 2007
Bangor, ME −0.215 0.027 Northern Michigan, MI 0.003 −0.067 Rapid City, SD 0.070 0.033
Portland, ME 0.053 0.159 Green Bay, WI −0.095 0.120 Sioux Falls, SD 0.175 −0.111
Boston, MA 0.263 0.285 Appleton, WI 0.018 −0.040 Sioux City, IA −0.002 −0.114
Burlington, VT −0.047 0.153 Traverse City, MI 0.022 0.152 Omaha, NE −0.003 −0.041
Albany, NY 0.151 0.114 Grand Rapids, MI 0.156 0.181 Lincoln, NE 0.046 −0.040
Syracuse, NY 0.011 0.168 Milwaukee, WI 0.153 0.229 Grand Island, NE −0.084 −0.156
Rochester, NY 0.127 0.055 Chicago, IL 0.242 0.127 North Platte, NE −0.076 −0.059
Buffalo, NY 0.071 0.109 Elkhart, IN 0.063 0.049 Wichita, KS 0.025 −0.026
State College, PA −0.162 −0.056 Fort Wayne, IN 0.032 −0.095 Topeka, KS −0.109 −0.134
New York, NY 0.243 0.220 Indianapolis, IN 0.046 0.007 Tulsa, OK 0.081 0.021
Harrisburg, PA −0.046 0.063 Champaign, IL 0.049 −0.146 Oklahoma City, OK 0.056 −0.050
Philadelphia, PA 0.126 0.185 Evansville, IN −0.115 −0.093 West Oklahoma, OK −0.191 −0.214
Washington, DC 0.088 0.044 Louisville, KY 0.049 −0.024 Dallas, TX 0.093 0.096
Salisbury, MD −0.076 0.050 Nashville, TN 0.034 −0.048 Abilene, TX −0.046 −0.205
Richmond, VA 0.020 −0.016 Paducah, KY −0.187 −0.093 San Angelo, TX −0.244 0.172
Staunton, VA 0.005 −0.059 Memphis, TN 0.046 −0.061 Austin, TX 0.143 0.157
Roanoke, VA 0.022 0.028 Huntsville, AL −0.117 −0.124 Houston, TX 0.105 0.047
Greensboro, NC 0.117 −0.012 Tupelo, MS −0.211 −0.139 Corpus Christi, TX 0.050 −0.057
Raleigh, NC 0.054 0.061 Greenville, MS −0.186 −0.144 McAllen, TX −0.146 −0.049
Norfolk, VA 0.027 0.150 Jackson, MS −0.031 −0.097 San Antonio, TX 0.013 0.079
Greenville, NC 0.000 −0.030 Birmingham, AL 0.031 0.015 Odessa, TX −0.004 −0.083
Fayetteville, NC −0.001 −0.050 Montgomery, AL −0.115 0.043 Hobbs, NM 0.115 −0.160
Charlotte, NC 0.178 0.025 Mobile, AL 0.113 −0.097 Lubbock, TX 0.010 0.004
Columbia, SC 0.073 −0.031 Pensacola, FL −0.050 0.031 Amarillo, TX 0.013 −0.044
Wilmington, NC −0.104 −0.017 Biloxi, MS −0.144 −0.038 Santa Fe, NM 0.058 −0.003
Charleston, SC 0.065 0.187 New Orleans, LA 0.108 0.040 Pueblo, CO −0.314 0.006
Augusta, GA 0.101 −0.145 Baton Rouge, LA 0.024 −0.043 Denver, CO 0.230 0.156
Savannah, GA 0.064 −0.052 Lafayette, LA 0.051 −0.082 Scottsbluff, NE −0.225 −0.198
Jacksonville, FL −0.047 0.142 Lake Charles, LA −0.034 −0.290 Casper, WY −0.109 −0.005
Orlando, FL 0.149 0.201 Beaumont, TX 0.004 −0.103 Billings, MT −0.016 −0.054
Miami, FL 0.156 0.157 Shreveport, LA −0.083 −0.087 Great Falls, MT −0.165 −0.094
Fort Myers, FL 0.063 0.153 Monroe, LA −0.073 0.005 Missoula, MT −0.118 −0.100
Sarasota, FL 0.089 0.162 Little Rock, AR −0.139 −0.010 Spokane, WA −0.027 0.120
Tampa, FL 0.121 0.149 Fort Smith, AR −0.146 −0.123 Idaho Falls, ID 0.004 −0.031
Tallahassee, FL −0.040 0.047 Fayetteville, AR −0.195 −0.005 Twin Falls, ID −0.081 −0.118
Dothan, AL −0.153 −0.032 Joplin, MO −0.047 −0.064 Boise City, ID −0.065 0.003
Albany, GA 0.008 −0.101 Springfield, MO −0.175 0.010 Reno, NV −0.099 0.051
Macon, GA −0.064 −0.148 Jonesboro, AR −0.205 −0.175 Salt Lake City, UT 0.036 0.057
Columbus, GA −0.117 −0.022 St. Louis, MO 0.101 0.012 Las Vegas, NV −0.084 −0.086
Atlanta, GA 0.066 0.034 Springfield, IL −0.045 −0.069 Flagstaff, AZ −0.049 0.153
Greenville, SC 0.057 −0.029 Columbia, MO −0.123 −0.062 Farmington, NM 0.055 0.170
Asheville, NC 0.039 0.109 Kansas City, MO 0.083 0.077 Albuquerque, NM 0.115 0.076
Chattanooga, TN 0.032 −0.102 Des Moines, IA 0.107 0.030 El Paso, TX −0.010 −0.039
Knoxville, TN 0.062 0.099 Peoria, IL −0.092 −0.039 Phoenix, AZ 0.128 0.151
Johnson City, TN −0.057 −0.157 Davenport, IA 0.064 −0.013 Tucson, AZ 0.008 0.081
Hickory, NC −0.023 0.020 Cedar Rapids, IA 0.022 0.079 Los Angeles, CA 0.236 0.175
Lexington, KY −0.084 −0.148 Madison, WI −0.015 −0.009 San Diego, CA 0.164 0.268
Charleston, WV −0.072 −0.083 La Crosse, WI −0.061 −0.152 Fresno, CA 0.020 0.057
Cincinnati, OH 0.179 0.120 Rochester, MN 0.034 0.007 San Francisco, CA 0.128 0.160
Dayton, OH 0.124 0.068 Minneapolis, MN 0.142 0.215 Sacramento, CA −0.025 0.058
Columbus, OH −0.001 0.037 Wausau, WI −0.105 −0.204 Redding, CA 0.049 −0.152
Wheeling, WV −0.280 −0.132 Duluth, MN −0.079 0.072 Eugene, OR 0.027 0.094
Pittsburgh, PA 0.013 0.144 Grand Forks, ND 0.048 −0.370 Portland, OR 0.083 0.129
Erie, PA 0.076 −0.015 Minot, ND −0.112 −0.298 Pendleton, OR −0.181 −0.206
Cleveland, OH 0.166 0.070 Bismarck, ND −0.245 −0.155 Richland, WA −0.187 −0.192
Toledo, OH 0.006 −0.005 Fargo, ND −0.149 0.073 Seattle, WA 0.021 0.111
Detroit, MI 0.165 0.183   Aberdeen, SD −0.009 −0.312
notes: Table lists estimated relative wage bill by BEA Economic Area and year. Economic Areas have been abbreviated to indicate 
first city and state they encompass. Complete results are reported in the online Appendix.
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in the figure, the number of regions in the third quartile declines over time, with the 
number of regions in the second and fourth quartiles growing disproportionately. In 
1972, the number of regions in each quartile is {43, 41, 43, 43}; for 1992 and 2007, 
they are {47, 46, 29, 48} and {45, 50, 26, 49}, respectively.
In Table 2, we report transition probabilities between relative wage bills’ sign 
and statistical significance from 1972–1992 and 1972–2007. We find substantial 
persistence in the pattern of departures from relative factor price equality over time. 
Figure 1. Distribution of Relative Wage Bill Coefficients (  α r ), by Year
note: Relative wage bills constrained to sum to 1 in each year.




















 Significantly lower 45 4 18 67
 Insignificant 13 0 4 17
 Significantly higher 21 8 57 86







 Significantly lower 50 5 20 75
 Insignificant 10 0 5 15
 Significantly higher 20 5 55 80
 Total 80 10 80 170
notes: Top panel reports the transition matrix between regions’ estimated wage bill sign and 
statistical significance between 1972 and 1992. Bottom panel reports transition between 1972 
and 2007.
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Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of Relative Wage Bill Estimates  
According to 1972 Quartiles, by Year
notes: Figure classifies the relative wage bills of BEA Economic Areas in noted year accord-
ing to quartiles defined by the 1972 distribution. The number of regions in each quartile are 
{43, 41, 43, 43} in 1972, {47, 46, 29, 48} in 1992, and {45, 50, 26, 49} in 2007. The 1972 relative 
wage bill cutoffs are −0.079, 0.013, and 0.070.
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Approximately 50 percent of regions with a positive and statistically significant 
departure from relative factor price equality in 1972 continue to exhibit a positive 
and statistically significant departure in 1992 and 2007. Similar results hold for neg-
ative and statistically significant departures. The correlation coefficients between 
the region fixed effects over time are 0.49 between 1972 and 1992, 0.51 between 
1972 and 2007, and 0.66 between 1992 and 2007.
Finally, to address the concern that our baseline specification estimates an aver-
age within-industry difference in regional relative wage bills that is the same for all 
industries, we also re-estimate (28) separately for each two-digit SIC sector in 1972 
and 1992 and each three-digit NAICS sector in 2007 using variation across four-
digit SIC and six-digit NAICS industries, respectively. Though census disclosure 
requirements preclude publication of results at this level, the null hypothesis that the 
region fixed effects are jointly statistically insignificant is rejected at the one percent 
level for each sector in each year, and again we find evidence of pervasive rejections 
of bilateral relative factor price equality.
Taken together, the results of this section provide strong evidence of persistent 
and increasing disparities in productivity-adjusted relative factor prices. Although 
the United States is typically viewed as having high levels of labor mobility relative 
to other nations, and although we examine regions at a relatively high level of spatial 
disaggregation, relative factor price equality is decisively rejected.
V. Discussion
A. relative Wages
While our test for relative factor price equality holds under general assump-
tions about factors, production, and markets, further intuition about the pattern of 
departures from relative factor price equality comes from consideration of a CES 
production technology with a common elasticity of substitution between factors of 
production across all industries. In this special case, from equations (16) and (28), 
the relationship between our estimates and relative wage bills in regions r and b 
under the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE is given by
(29)   e   α r  =  η rb   nP =  γ rb   nP  [ ( γ rb   nP ) 1/(ρ−1) ] .
Assuming an elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1 − ρ), we can use this expression 
to decompose the relative wage bills (  α r ) estimated in the previous section into two 
parts: productivity-adjusted relative wages,  γ rb   nP , and productivity-adjusted relative 
factor use, ( γ rb   nP ) 1/(ρ−1) .
Although the assumption of a common CES production technology is strong, a 
number of empirical studies in the labor economics literature have sought to esti-
mate an aggregate elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled work-
ers using various skill definitions (see, for example, Katz and Murphy 1992 and 
Murphy, Riddell, and Romer 1998). In their summary of this literature, Katz and 
Autor (1999) note that the estimated elasticity typically lies in the range of 1 to 3, 
with Katz and Murphy (1992) estimating an elasticity of 1.41.
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Here, we assume σ = 1.5 to provide a coarse approximation of the variation in 
productivity-adjusted relative wages and relative employment implied by our esti-
mates of   α r . Under this assumption, Boston’s maximum relative wage bill in 1972 (130 percent) can be decomposed into an implied productivity-adjusted relative 
wage of 59 percent (i.e., exp(1.30 ) −2 ) and implied productivity-adjusted relative 
employment of 220 percent (i.e., exp(1.30 ) 3 ). Likewise, Pueblo’s minimum relative 
wage bill in 1972 can be decomposed into an implied relative wage of 188 per-
cent and implied relative employment of 39 percent.22 More generally, the top and 
bottom panels of Figure 3 use σ = 1.5 to plot the implied distributions of relative 
22 The implied differences in relative wages and relative employment fall with the assumed elasticity of substitu-
tion. For example, using σ = 2, Boston’s 130 percent relative wage bill in 1972 decomposes into a relative wage of 
77 percent and relative employment of 170 percent.
Implied log productivity-adjusted relative wages,
by year
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Figure 3. Distribution of log Implied Productivity-Adjusted Relative Wages  
and Employment under CES Production, by Year
note: Distributions assume CES production and an elasticity of substitution of 1.5.
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 productivity-adjusted relative wages and employment for each year. To increase read-
ability of the left tail of these distributions, we plot them in log form. As illustrated in 
the figure, implied relative wages and relative employment vary widely across regions 
in all three years. Here, the increase in density in the right tail of the relative wage bill 
distribution in Figure 1 is manifest in the increase in density in the left and right tails 
in the relative wage and relative employment distributions, respectively.
From equation (12), observed variation in relative wages under the alternate 
hypothesis of non-RFPE can be decomposed into the contributions of variation in 
productivity-adjusted relative wages and differences in relative factor productivity. 
Hence our estimates of productivity-adjusted relative wages under CES (  γ rb nP ) can 
be used together with observed relative wages to estimate the relative productivity 
of nonproduction workers for each region-industry:
(30)    
 θ rj n
 _  θ rj P
=  1 _   γ rb nP   
 ∼ wrj n/ ∼ wrj P
 _ ∼ wbj n/ ∼ wbj P  .
To provide an indication of the average differences in relative factor productiv-
ity across regions implied by our results, we first estimate average differences in 
observed relative wages using a regression directly analogous to (28),
(31)  ln  (  ∼ wrj n _ ∼ wrj P ) =  β r +  λ j +  χ rj , 
where   βr captures average within-industry differences in relative wages across 
regions and we again cluster the standard errors by region. As in equation (28), we 
purge observed relative wages of industry effects by including the λ j fixed effects. 
Again, we impose the normalization that the region and industry fixed effects each 
sum to zero, which implies that our implicit base region is the mean across regions 
and industries. Using (30) and (31), we estimate the average differences in relative 
factor productivity across regions as   θ rj n/  θ rj P = exp (  βr ) /  γ rb nP .
Combining these results with our estimated differences in productivity-adjusted 
relative wages ( γ rb   nP ), we find that the productivity of nonproduction workers relative 
to production workers in Boston is 196 percent (1.45/0.74) higher than in Pueblo 
in 1972, and 194 percent (1.08/0.55) higher than in Grand Forks in 2007. These 
estimates capture all variation in the relative productivity, quality, and composition 
of nonproduction and production workers across regions. In Figure 4, we display 
the distribution of our estimates for log relative factor productivity across regions. 
As with relative wage bills and productivity-adjusted relative wages, we find pro-
nounced polarization in relative factor productivity over time.
While the results of this section rely on a strong functional form assumption, and 
are subject to the difficulty of determining an appropriate elasticity of substitution 
between production and nonproduction workers, they suggest that our rejection of 
relative factor price equality above involves substantial differences in productivity- 
adjusted relative wages across regions for plausible parameter values. At the same 
time, these findings raise the question of how such disparities in productivity-adjusted 
relative factor prices can be sustained over a long time period. Potential explanations 
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include frictions to geographical mobility (so that real wages need not be equal-
ized across regions),23 different expenditure shares of nonproduction and produc-
tion workers on immobile goods such as housing (so that real wage equalization for 
each group of workers does not necessarily imply relative wage equalization),24 and 
the non-random sorting of workers by productivity across regions (since real wage 
equalization applies to the marginal worker rather than inframarginal workers).25 
An advantage of our methodology is that we use firm cost minimization to test 
the equalization of productivity-adjusted relative wages without having to specify 
workers’ location decisions, and hence our methodology is not required to take a 
stand on the relative importance of each of these explanations. Nevertheless, we 
believe further exploration of them is an interesting area for further research.
B. industry Structure
We now provide some suggestive evidence on the relationship between our esti-
mated departures from relative factor price equality and industry structure.
Under the null hypothesis that productivity-adjusted relative factor prices are 
equalized between a pair of regions, the zero-profit conditions for positive produc-
tion are satisfied in the same set of industries for both regions. Hence, it is feasible 
that they have the same industry structure. Under the alternative hypothesis that 
 productivity-adjusted relative factor prices are not equalized, however, the zero-
profit conditions for positive production cannot be satisfied in the same set of indus-
tries for both regions, which implies that they cannot specialize in exactly the same 
23 See Bound and Holzer (2000) for evidence of imperfect labor mobility within the United States.
24 See Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) for evidence on regional variation in housing prices.
25 See Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) for evidence on worker sorting.












Figure 4. Distribution of Implied log Relative Productivity  
under CES Production, by Year
note: Distributions assume CES production and an elasticity of substitution of 1.5.
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mix of industries. We emphasize that these relationships between industry structure 
and relative factor prices are not causal, but rather capture a relationship between 
two endogenous variables in a zero-profit equilibrium.26
In our data, industry structure varies considerably between region pairs. On aver-
age across all unique bilateral region pairs, approximately one third of the larger 
region’s industries are in common to both regions. To explore whether these differ-
ences in industry structure are related to departures from relative factor price equal-
ity, we estimate the following regressions:
(32)  coMMo n rs =  δ 0 +  δ 1 |   α r −   α s | +  δ 2  i r +  δ 3  i s +  ψ rs , 
(33) ΔcoMMo n rs =  ϕ 0 +  ϕ 1 Δ |   α r −   α s | +  ϕ 2 Δ i r +  ϕ 3 Δ i s +  ψ rs , 
where coMMo n rs is the number of industries that regions r and s produce in com-
mon in a given year; |   α r −   α s | is the absolute difference in the regions’ estimated 
wage bills;  i r and  i s control for the total number of industries produced by each 
region; and Δ indicates a change from either 1972–1992 or 1972–2007. We esti-
mate the above regressions as separate cross sections for each year, clustering the 
standard errors by region.
In the levels specification (32), we find estimated coefficients (standard errors) 
for  δ 1 of −64.35 (1.98), −44.28 (1.87), and −63.10 (2.04) for 1972, 1992, and 2007 
respectively (complete regression output is reported in the online Appendix). Using 
these coefficients, a pair of regions with the maximum estimated differences in rela-
tive wage bills have 37, 32, and 41 fewer industries in common, respectively.27 In 
the changes specification (33), we find estimated coefficients (standard errors) for 
ϕ 1 of −4.83 (0.65) and −6.71 (0.62) for 1972–1992 and 1992–2007 respectively, 
as also reported in the online Appendix. Using these estimated coefficients, a pair 
of regions with the maximum estimated change in the differences in their relative 
wage bills produce three and four fewer industries in common between 1972 and 
1992, and 1992 and 2007, respectively.28 While only indicative, these results suggest 
that departures from relative factor price equality are correlated with differences in 
industry structure.
VI. Conclusion
This paper proposes a test for relative factor price equality that allows for factor-
augmenting productivity differences that vary by factor, region, and industry. Our 
approach is based on cost minimization, which implies that the observed quan-
tities chosen by firms facing observed prices contain information about factors’ 
26 For an empirical analysis of multiple cones of diversification, see Debaere (2004) and Schott (2003).
27 The maximum difference in estimated relative wage bills in 1972, 1992, and 2007 are 0.58, 0.73, and 0.65, 
respectively.
28 In unreported results, we also find a strong affinity between regions’ relative wage bills and the factor intensi-
ties of the industries that are added and dropped by regions over time. Regions with high relative wage bills (low 
relative wages) for nonproduction workers are more likely to add and drop nonproduction worker and production-
worker intensive industries, respectively.
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 unobserved attributes. We show that when observed quantities and prices are mul-
tiplied, terms in factor productivity cancel, so that the equality of productivity-
adjusted relative wages can be tested using data on observed relative wage bills. 
Since our approach is derived from cost minimization, it holds under general 
assumptions about factors, production, and markets, including both perfect and 
imperfect competition. As our test controls for unobserved differences in factor 
productivity, quality, and composition, it is suitable for contexts in which worker 
characteristics are imperfectly observed or missing, as emphasized in the recent 
literature on residual wage inequality.
We implement our test for relative factor price equality using data on 170 local 
labor markets defined by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis over a thirty-
five year period spanning 1972, 1992, and 2007. Although the US is typically 
viewed as having high levels of labor mobility, we find substantial departures 
from relative factor price equality that increase in magnitude over time. While 
there is substantial persistence in the regions with high and low relative wage 
bills, the distribution of relative wage bills exhibits polarization over time, with an 
increase in the fraction of regions characterized by extreme high and low relative 
wage bills. Under additional assumptions about the production technology, the 
estimated differences in relative wage bills imply substantial variation in relative 
productivity- adjusted wages and relative worker productivity for plausible elastic-
ities of substitution. Consistent with the predictions of a zero-profit equilibrium, 
we find that our estimated differences in relative wage bills are systematically 
related to industry structure.
Our findings of persistent departures from relative factor price equality are 
suggestive of frictions to geographical mobility, different expenditure shares of 
nonproduction and production workers on immobile goods such as housing, or the 
systematic sorting of workers across regions. Since our methodology is based on 
firm cost minimization, it does not depend on assumptions about workers’ loca-
tion decisions, and holds under each of these scenarios. Nevertheless, an interest-
ing area for further research is discriminating between these and other potential 
explanations. More broadly, our methodology might be applied to other settings 
where unobserved variation in productivity, quality, or composition is an impor-
tant problem for identification. A similar test based on consumer expenditure 
minimization, for example, could be developed to test the law of one price across 
geographic areas.
Appendix: Absolute Factor Price Equalization (AFPE)
This Appendix develops a test for absolute factor price equality that controls for 
factor-augmenting productivity differences. Like our test for relative factor price 
equality, it makes use of the result that terms in factor productivity cancel when 
observed wages and employment are multiplied. To test absolute factor price equal-
ization (AFPE) we analyze variation across regions in the share of total payments to 
a factor of production in output. Though our demonstration here is for nonproduc-
tion workers, the analysis for other factors of production is analogous. Observed 
employment of nonproduction workers may be obtained from equations (2) and 
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(3). Multiplying observed employment by observed wages and dividing by output, 
we obtain
(A1)    
∼ wrj n  ∼ nrj 
 _ y rj  =  
 w r n n rj 
 _ y rj  =  w r 
n   
∂  Γ j (⋅) _∂  w r n  , 
where, from the total cost function (4),  Γ j (⋅) is the unit cost function and 
 Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n corresponds to the unit input requirement for productivity-adjusted 
nonproduction workers. Under the null hypothesis of AFPE, productivity-adjusted 
wages are equal across regions ( w r n =  w b n ) and observed wages vary in direct pro-
portion to unobserved factor productivity ( w rj n =  θ rj n  w b n ), where we again choose 
region b as a reference region so that  θ bj n = 1∀j. Identical productivity-adjusted fac-
tor prices in turn imply that unit input requirements for productivity-adjusted factors 
are the same across regions. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of AFPE, factor 
shares in equation (A1) are equalized across regions:
(A2)  ( H 0 : AFPE ),    w r 
n  n rj 
 _ y rj  =  
 w b n n bj 
 _ y bj  .
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-AFPE, regions may be characterized by 
different productivity-adjusted factor prices and hence different unit input require-
ments for productivity-adjusted factors. As a result, from equation (A2), factor 
shares in the two regions are related as follows:
(A3)  ( H 1 : non − AFPE ),    w r 
n n rj 
 _ y rj  =  γ rb 
n
  ( ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w r n  _ ∂  Γ j (⋅)/∂  w b n )    w b n  n bj  _ y bj  .
Together, equations (A2) and (A3) provide the basis for a test of the null hypoth-
esis of AFPE, with AFPE implying a testable parameter restriction in equation (A3).
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